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Collective creativity: wisdom or oxymoron? 
 
Kazem Chaharbaghi, University of East London, London, UK 
Sandy Cripps, University of East London, London, UK 
 
Abstract 
 
Purpose – The purpose of the paper is to demonstrate ways in which collective 
creativity and individual creativity exist in an “and/both” rather than in an “either/or” 
relationship. 
 
Design / methodology approach – This study uses and interrelates a number of 
dualities using “metalectics”, the principal task of which is to balance seemingly 
conflicting opposites by revealing them and locating them on their strengths. 
 
Findings – Collective creativity, as a bridging metaphor, renders itself as an 
oxymoron, both literally and as an outcome: where individual and collective creativity 
are dichotomised, diversity is treated as a constraint, and collaboration is confused 
with coordination. 
 
Research limitations/implications – An essential of creativity is deviancy, and that 
this has to be valued to bring about change. 
 
Practical implications – Heterogeneous communities of practice should not be 
confused with homogenous communities of practice because this causes artificial 
dialogues that destroy the very creativity they claim to ignite. 
 
Originality/value – The paper offers an alternative way of thinking, arguing for a 
move away from simplified, unbalanced perspectives of creativity that focus on one-
dimensionality and asymmetry. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Although the history of humankind holds many examples of individual creativity that 
are confined to the mental labour of a lone genius working in isolation, in an 
oppressive social setting that disapproves of deviance, many human achievements, 
including that of walking on the moon, have involved the collaboration between many 
creative individuals, each with unique experiences, varying interests and different 
perspectives. Such heterogeneous communities of interest form naturally in order to 
meet a multi-faceted challenge of common concern that cannot be met individually. 
These communities differ markedly from and must not be confused with homogenous 
communities of practice, whose members specialise and focus on a certain domain 
 2 
undertaking similar work. Although organisations that find themselves in a 
performance crisis elevate collective creativity and its control to the top of their 
survival agenda, this seemingly easy prize has proved to be illusive. This is strange, 
because history in relation to creativity shows that the human race has been able to 
imagine the inconceivable and the apparently impossible. The key question is 
therefore why collective creativity can be problematic in organisations. 
 
In addressing this question it is important to recognise that creative actions begin 
with imagination, which is the driver of change and as a mode of thinking is often 
beyond existing knowledge. Imagination in its creative mental state cannot be 
touched, tasted, or measured. It has an emotional form before it has a concrete form. 
Imagination can be seen in the language of freedom used to describe it, which 
reflects the unworldly understandings of the senses mixed together with practical 
interpretations of its application (Wittgenstein, 2001). Constructed stories about the 
process and application of imagination are full of contradictory metaphors, riddled 
with bewilderment, mystery, faith, belief, and plain prejudice. Imagination is an 
important part of our “other”, embodied, real world that we feel but cannot prove. It is 
an unpredictable process of creative thought beyond current understanding that 
begins with someone being confused by existing explanations of reality, or intrigued 
by their absence. In its pure form, imagination is liberating where there is 
lawlessness about it; as a process of thinking it is individually self-governed and in 
this way it is starkly different to those thinking skills needed to acquire knowledge, 
which are generally passive and can be forms of oppression (Freire, 1972). The 
nature of creativity is defiant. This is why creativity and social consensus are thought 
to make uncomfortable bedfellows. Expressions of creativity change things, 
especially traditional ways of thinking, as the new ideas become accepted. Collective 
creativity is perceived in current discourse as a commercial opportunity derived from 
designing the collective context successfully (Taylor, 2002). Yet there is a veil of 
silence in organisational and management discourses around the anarchistic senses 
that imagination and its subsequent creative thoughts and acts utilises (Chen, 2006; 
De Leede and Looise, 2005; Kratzer et al., 2006). Indeed, organisations can simply 
be seen as representations of political arenas, where organisational story telling 
defines and controls how senses should be utilised (Easterby-Smith and Araujo, 
1999). In the struggle to understand creativity and to move beyond our own situation, 
a useful starting point would be to ask: “Does current wisdom have to be sacrificed 
for the other sense, or is it something more than either of these?”. 
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The key consideration is that an over-reliance on traditional rational management 
methods is held partly to blame for poor creative achievements within organisations. 
In this connection, there are at least two key factors. First, consensus cultures have 
been shown to be a process of organising that isolates and often punishes individual 
difference. Thus, it can be argued that rationally managed organisations have the 
potential to demonise the very people that have the potential to break free from the 
mould and think differently (Argyris, 1985). Second, tricky problems in complex 
markets have been shown to need composite solutions beyond the knowledge and 
expertise of one person or unitary think tank (Stacey, 2001). The need for change is 
therefore blindingly obvious. Increasingly, management demands more collective 
creativity and releases resources in pursuit of achieving it. Nevertheless, there is a 
general reluctance in training, or awareness sessions to challenge traditional ways of 
organising. Instead, the individual has become targeted as the devil in the pack. 
Consequently, programmes designed to improve individual creativity through 
acquiring more appropriate functional skills have flourished under the banner of 
change management, creating innovation, and acting creatively. It is as if humankind 
has never had the wherewithal to be creative, rather than it simply needs to be 
reignited. Given this apparent reactive, uncompetitive response to a highly 
competitive problem, it is important to understand why this is happening and what 
purpose it serves. 
 
The starting assumption in this study is that management decisions have meaning to 
those who make them. The task here is not to suggest a solution to the creativity 
problem, but to reveal the meanings behind the actions taken within organisations so 
that choices and actions can be better understood. By allowing opposing realities to 
be revealed and the strengths of each developed, this study will demonstrate that 
organisations fail to bring home the creativity prize because the current practice put 
in place to generate it, is derived from a mistaken understanding of community and 
its meaning where creativity is concerned. Further, by revealing a family of creative 
acts this paper is able to show that one management style and organisational 
process will not be sufficient to meet all the different types of creativity. 
 
The purpose behind problemitising creativity 
 
It is no secret that conundrums are the lifeblood of social science; truth is difficult to 
establish, causing (in this case) competing explanations of how to manage for 
creativity to co-exist. However, there is a significant difference in the way creativity is 
thought to be liberated when working within an organisation based on collectivism, 
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whose structures and processes are designed to complement benefits derived from 
difference, compared to those based on collectivisation, which emphasises the 
benefits derived from normalising. While both approaches strive to reap added value 
from organising, their fundamental belief structures are significantly different. Unlike 
truth, belief is not self-evidenced: it is a cultural construction. The first construction is 
derived from a heterogeneous community, the second from a homogeneous 
community. Those who champion individualism, for example, can only perceive 
collective creativity as useful up to the point where individual needs are met, since in 
this interpretation of reality individuals are in competition with each other. Any 
collaboration as a result of an individual being creative can only be short and any 
community built to aid transactions transient. Social tensions that might arise from 
“others” being used in any way are nullified by the notion of creative talent. This 
legitimating process is expressed in everyday metaphors that categorise creative 
people as special, unique people – champions, eccentric, gifted, natural leaders. 
Celebrations of these special talents are endemic in organisational stories about 
success, yet there are no prizes for trying and failing. Thus, within the cult of the 
individual, at the organisational level of application, lies a conundrum: being creative 
is actually personally dangerous should the idea fail. Yet all creative acts are 
fundamentally risky. Given the risk factor involved in being creative within an 
organisational setting, individuals have to make a choice about the level of risk they 
are prepared to undertake in the conditions that exist at the time. Eager to celebrate 
successful creativity, the preponderance of reactive behaviour derived from 
individuals' personal risk evaluation in a particular organisation has to be demonised; 
it cannot be acknowledged as a rational and sensible response to a particular 
condition as this would imply changing the underpinning logic of organising for 
imaginative outcomes. To protect the underpinning logic of individualism it is 
necessary that the blame is targeted towards lack of individual creativity, rather than 
the structure and process of the organisation concerned.  
 
With an organisation constructed to look as if it now needs fixing the conundrum can 
be resolved. This is because the stage is now set for rational management to take 
centre stage, “problems” can be targeted and re-branded as personal “opportunities” 
that should be grasped. To do this the language of certainty replaces the central 
tenet of creativity, spontaneous emergence. Employees thus become the objects of 
investigation where management physicians present prognosis and cures based on 
collectivising organisational communities, which relies on monitoring conformity to 
process and practice as a way of being productive. Any recognition that actively 
 5 
using individual difference can be a productive way to be creative would cause the 
foundations to crumble. Thus the language of the cult of the individual, based on 
heterogeneity, is deliberately swapped for that of consensus, homogeneity; as if by 
magic it becomes embedded within rational management to prevent anarchy within. 
Ignoring the importance of community permits individual employees to be artificially 
portrayed as the cause of poor imagination within organisations (Dunn, 1991), 
legitimising the preponderance of training programmes that miss the connections 
through which creativity merges. Dialogic trickery allows discourse about individual 
talent to persist at the same time as consensus becomes powerful. 
 
To hide the unpalatable truth that conflict can be productive, rational managers, the 
physicians, play two character parts using a double dialogue: one which they display 
to their subordinates and one they keep “behind the scenes” for those who think as 
they do (Goffman, 1959, p. 107). They create platforms for creativity by bringing 
together people who think differently, because this is what “state of the art” 
management discourse demands. Inevitably this fails because whilst it is possible to 
force cooperation, collaboration is a spontaneous result of interaction between 
people, which cannot be forced or managed. If people do not bond, no amount of 
management will change this; without the engagement necessary for creativity the 
expected outcomes cannot be realised and thus offer the opportunity for what 
rational mangers do best – regulation. It is at this point that the language of 
organisational schizophrenia is most explicit. Managers resort to picking on and 
blaming an individual's incapacity to come up to the mark and be creative; amongst 
their friends they mourn their lack of success and mollify themselves by resorting to 
their belief, which gives them solace. Through this process they can claim it is not 
their fault; how could they possibly achieve anything with such a bunch of misfits? In 
this way rational managers demand and reject those individuals who have the 
capacity to think differently. The language of organisational schizophrenia and its use 
is not a mistake. It is the outcome of a psychotic disorder that is derived from a 
general dissatisfaction with the amount of creativity rational management creates, 
combined with reluctance by those who have faith to admit that those very 
approaches are the cause. Their only choice is to speak in a double dialogue that 
simultaneously supports belief and disbelief in what they are doing; such self-
preservation techniques are appropriate in an individualistic world to hide evident 
truths and legitimise rational management approaches so that they remain a powerful 
force. 
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Those who support collectivism argue that rational managers are missing the key 
point of creativity – that it is an individual and social activity. They suggest there is a 
complete failure by rational managers to recognise organisations as “sites of cultural 
production”, with social networks that reflect the community in which the organisation 
is placed (Herndl, 1993, p. 354). Organising with dependency and interdependency 
as the ground rules of creative thinking provides connections between discourses, 
social and cultural structures (Goffman, 1959), and thus a platform from which 
creativity can be derived. Additionally, the image of managers as rational, 
emotionless, individuals leaves them without the senses needed to be creative or the 
language to express it (Chaharbaghi and Cripps, 2004). Hence those who cannot, or 
will not, accept the social nature of creativity can only live in a schizophrenic world of 
illusion and denial. They create a “make believe” world where, fooled by their own 
foolishness, they attempt to fool others. In a fool's paradise the only thing that 
matters is the ways in which individuals raid the knowledge bank: thus a seemingly 
harmless metaphor that helps us define creativity has the potential to swap from the 
merely illustrative to the dangerous (Newman, 2006) as they become expressions of 
power over discourse. 
 
The double dialogue: overcoming the organisational schizophrenia 
 
A number of interrelated dualities can account for overcoming the organisational 
schizophrenia surrounding creativity in organisations. These include reason and 
instinct, content and process, and individual and collective creativity. In capturing 
these dualities, the methodological underpinnings of this study have been based on 
what Chaharbaghi and Cripps (2006) term “metalectics”, the logic of which they state 
stems from: 
 
… the recognition that the world of values is inconsistent because it is made up of 
antagonistic elements; that full commitment to opposing perspectives simultaneously 
is impossible, yet each demands total acceptance; that this is not a case of logical 
contradiction because it involves human values; and that it represents a kind of 
contradiction that lies at the heart of divergent agendas and practices. Based on 
these recognitions, metalectics can be considered as a way of describing choice-
making through three kinds of complimentary inquiries: namely, an empathetic 
enquiry, a sympathetic inquiry, and a dialectic inquiry applied dialectically. An 
empathetic inquiry attempts to understand as much as possible the value 
assumptions, hidden motivations and arguments of differing positions that support 
their rationale. A sympathetic inquiry does not deny the value assumptions of 
assertions, models or paradigms of others but never
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questions as possible about them. The idea is to play the devil's advocate in the role 
of a critical friend and consider whether alternative arguments are more convincing. 
At the meta-theoretical level of exploration a dialectic applied dialectically goes 
beyond competing explanations to establish an alternative way of thinking about 
choice. A dialectic applied dialectically avoids the limitations of compromise that is 
reached by a dialectic that is applied objectively i.e. the weakening of polarised 
discourses through a process of denying the strengths of each position. This is an 
important point because where compromise between argument positions is reached, 
individuals have no rational or good reason to accept or reject it. In other words, 
compromise is founded on an individual's or a group's participation in the solution but 
weak engagement with the struggle. The artistry involved in metalectics is exposed 
where the individual perceiving extremes in conflict uses their emotional intelligences 
such as empathy and sympathy to enable engagement with the struggle without 
commitment to a particular position. The aim is to keep polarised positions in the 
struggle of opposition because only through this struggle can true dialectic survive. It 
is therefore necessary to ensure that each discursive theme is not destroyed. A 
metalectic discourse is thus one that masters the art of argument using the strengths 
of each of the diverse argument positions to transform understanding. 
 
In overcoming the organisational schizophrenia surrounding creativity in 
organisations, using metalectics, reason must first be delineated from instinct. One 
view is that creative thinking is a process that replaces reason with instinct. Albert 
Einstein, for example, states: “I'm enough of an artist to draw freely on my 
imagination, which I think is more important than knowledge. Knowledge is limited” 
(Viereck, 1929). Creative people seem unusual because in a largely material world 
their imagination is not triggered by its usefulness. They are celebrated as unique 
rule-breakers, because they are not like us and neither are they like each other; with 
such diversity it is impossible to categorise them as a group or identify particular 
traits. This poses all kinds of problems when we try to work out how to deal with 
them, never mind develop them. Grouping, classifying, and labelling become 
redundant: without these boundaries of description there appears to be no reason or 
common sense about what they do. Creative people are thus presented as an 
enigma because their imagination defies what has become accepted as common 
sense. The real conundrum, hidden by the illusion that imagination is indescribable, 
is that creative people are not always heroes. The very act of thinking and acting 
beyond reason can also cause creative people to find themselves feared, resisted, 
and rejected: feared because such acts cannot be accounted for within accepted 
reason, thus they increase uncertainty; resisted because creative acts bring about 
change when it is sometimes unwanted; and rejected because creativity can be seen 
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as contradicting reason – directly challenging the status quo. The truth is, creative 
people are both loved and hated, and it is this real story that is shrouded by myth 
when imagination is at play. Where the structure of society is dependent on social 
cohesion, culturally constructed metaphors serve to hide the unpalatable truth – 
imagination and the continuous development of knowledge is dependent on the 
deviant character of creativity, and creative people. To cloak this challenge to social 
cohesion, Western common sense preferences that which can be touched, felt, or 
calculated; this has ensured that the stories about creative people makes large an 
individual's personal character (Ross and Nisbett, 1991). We are encouraged to give 
thanks to these unique people with innate capabilities: any discussions about 
unfairness are scuppered. 
 
The “real” story is that social context is a key player in the game of creativity. Social 
conventions, attitudes, and behaviours have some control over reactions to the new, 
to its meaning, and to its possibilities (Hagan, 1994). Sometimes this can act to 
prevent a public launch of new ideas (Miller, 2000). Parables, fables, stories and 
symbols falsely present creativity as always about personal skills and personal 
freedom (Alcoff, 1998). In reality, whether a creative act is exploited is a lottery. 
Difficult to accept creativity does not emerge into the public space as easily as that 
deemed socially acceptable: “not acceptable” creative deviant thinking will not be 
celebrated (Foucault, 1980). The level of social concern attached to the expression of 
deviant thinking can cause its rejection; for example, in the UK eccentric behaviour is 
admired as an expression of freedom, whereas murder is unilaterally condemned 
(Hagan, 1994). To be celebrated, deviant creativity has to be socially admired 
(Taylor, 2002); this might involve having the personality to carry it off, the motivation 
to keep going, cultural permission to expose your idea, or holding a social position in 
society that guarantees you a hearing (Bourdieu, 1993). 
 
While the myth of individual talent is deeply embedded in our cultures of 
understanding, it is not believed: this is demonstrated in the popularity of the 
Dragons' Den, where innovators are given a “chance” to “make good” by “pitching” 
for support from a financial dragon. Social limitations over the means to succeed are 
recognisable and real enough; they also account for why some people who could be 
creative select instead to conform, retreat, or play the game without any commitment 
(Merton, 1938a). They may also account for why some choose an alternative deviant 
game – for example crime – to access material wealth that they would otherwise not 
achieve (Lea and Young, 1993). Being deviant is a necessary but not sufficient 
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condition of creativity that benefits society at large. The point of the stories about the 
heroes of creativity is to show us how we should differentiate between good and bad: 
they amplify “safe” creativity, that which does not challenge current wisdom and its 
power structures. In general, the deviant nature of imagination is played down. The 
metaphors of creativity cloak “good” creativity so that it seems safe; it hides the 
reality that all creativity is derived from dumping conformity. By association the 
personality of the creative person is made less dangerous, whereas the truth is that 
acting from feeling responses creative people are temperamental, unpredictable, and 
far from safe (Goldie, 2002). 
 
The duality between content and process follows logically from the duality between 
reason and instinct. To imagine the impossible starts with understanding the 
limitations of the possible – thus process and content, knowledge and imagination, 
are intertwined. The process and content metaphors, knowledge and feeling, are 
placed in opposition to prevent the possibility of thinking about them as intrinsically 
connected, as different complementary sides of the same coin (Schwartz and Ogilvy, 
1979). This is because knowing about creative people and their creative acts, and 
understanding them, would rely heavily on other intrinsic senses, such as feelings 
and emotions. This would imply extending the partial view of explanatory sense 
making that rational management presents. There is a lot to be gained by 
suppressing this notion by whatever means. The rational argument cites the 
unpredictability of emotional senses as its weakness. It is true that emotions are very 
individual, “a person's character, mood, thoughts, feelings, sayings, actions, bodily 
changes, expressions of emotions, and self interpretations, as well as your own 
emotions, mood, and character, all play a part in the project of understanding and 
explaining that person's emotions” (Goldie, 2002, p. 189). However, the language of 
the emotions is essentially shareable (Hacker, 1990). Creative people are thus not 
unknowable; they are simply baffling. The workings of these other senses that they 
use would provide greater depth of understanding in relation to the way they balance 
and preference the individual and the social – in short, exposing these encounters 
would add to the account of what creativity is and how it is enacted. 
 
The duality between individual and collective creativity brings together the two 
dualities considered above in a common cause to overcome the organisational 
schizophrenia surrounding creativity in organisations. Quite cleverly it could be said, 
left without a language to express our emotions within organisations, hence an 
understanding of how we might use our emotions in sense making, creativity is 
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without explanation; this leaves metaphorical opposites presented as belief and its 
allegiance. Collective creativity and individual creativity appear as in opposition. 
Supporters of individual creativity argue you either have it or you do not: “our species 
is the only creative species, and it has one creative instrument, the individual mind 
and spirit of man. Nothing was ever created by two men. There are no good 
collaborations, whether in music, in art, in mathematics, in philosophy. Once the 
miracles of creation have taken place, the group can build and extend it, but the 
group never invents anything. The preciousness lies in the lonely mind of a man” 
(Steinbeck, 1952, p. 131). Supporters of creativity as a collective act argue this view 
is simply a caricature without real meaning. They argue creativity can only be derived 
from an interaction between people (Florida, 2002). Presented as opposing 
metaphors they seem at first glance to offer different explanations of how creativity is 
derived. However, the meanings of creativity offered by Steinbeck and Florida differ 
because their beliefs provide different starting points of the journey along the path of 
creativity. Exposed as descriptions of the same race, that start differently, offers other 
possibilities. 
 
Connecting the double dialogue: the family of creative acts 
 
In order to place collective creativity in a context within which it is valid, it is 
necessary to reveal the multiple images of creativity to expose the “family” of 
imaginative acts and then to identify to which collective and individual creativity might 
be attached. Picasso is a good example of a creative person driven by something 
that intrigued him. He played a high-risk, rule-breaking game when he broke away 
from tradition in his paintings, sculptures and etchings: 
 
… my first drawings could never have been shown at an exhibition of children's 
drawings. I lacked the clumsiness of the child, his naivety. I made academic drawings 
at the age of seven, the minute precision of which frightened me (Walther, 2000, p. 
8). 
 
In order to paint what he thought was important Picasso describes his resistance to 
the norms at play, his self-acknowledged differences of perception, and a fear of 
knowing he was different. Nevertheless, he continued to do what he thought was 
right even though his immediate audience failed to celebrate his achievements. In 
constructing his self-image Picasso was able to continue his work because he relied 
more on how he thought he should behave as an artist and less on how he was 
expected to behave: his self-identity remained stable because what he was doing 
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made sense to him (Giddens, 1991). Using his own senses he was able to keep 
going, against the odds. His work entered the public domain because it was there, 
and there was no stopping it. Everyone is involved in this balancing act of identity 
creation derived from the socially expected and the self-selected (Mead, 1934). This 
involves weighting the importance of individual free will and an obligation to society in 
some personal way. Picasso's type of creativity is well and truly “over the edge”; 
where it transforms the existing system, breaks the boundaries of the understandable 
by presenting it with an unheard of problem, and replaces it with the unimaginable. 
 
Innovators are also part of the creative family, but they are a different species and 
the problem they address is in a different class of creative acts to those of Picasso. 
Innovation is a process of transforming existing ideas into a useful outcome. 
Innovators are creative within the goals deemed acceptable, though they can 
sometimes change the means to achieve them if they are excluded from accessing 
those means (Merton, 1938b). The industrial revolution, for example, relied heavily 
on the inspiration of the Quakers, who created their own banks to bring their ideas 
into the public domain: collectively they tackled a root cause of exclusion. Innovators, 
like the creators, are still rebellious but in a different way and for a different purpose. 
The individual cannot instigate this type of creativity because they would already be 
outside of the boundaries by rejecting them. This type of creativity is “leading edge” 
because the creativity derived is contained by its usefulness. This problem is only 
definable in a particular paradigm, and without a belief in this paradigm the problem 
is meaningless: the solutions stretch the boundaries of the understandable, but do 
not transform them. 
 
Collective creativity, on the other hand, evolves from a spontaneous collaboration 
between heterogeneous individuals who are drawn together to solve a multi-faceted 
challenge of common concern, which cannot be met individually. This natural 
collaboration is received favourably when there is a challenge of common concern. 
Such collaboration can be viewed unfavourably if it threatens current wisdom, but 
even so can serve as a catalyst for change: for example, the gay movement was 
derived from a collective who questioned their behaviour as deviant. Whether it is 
viewed as acceptable or unacceptable, collective creativity relies on shared forms of 
knowledge and understanding to derive mutual benefit. Collective creators are in a 
class of their own; they function in a heterarchy, a system based on equal power 
sharing, where different types of knowledge and skills function together without any 
kind of privilege. The character of each group is uniquely derived from the networks 
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within which the participators participate, and the trust they create (Putman, 1995). 
Collectively they provide and construct meaning in relation to the problem that must 
be solved. Collective creation is “leading edge” because the problem is social. 
Collaboration and trust is derived from existing knowledge, which is then 
incrementally improved. Problem solutions are about crossing over boundaries, not 
transforming. 
 
The stark difference between those practising pure creativity, the innovators, and the 
creative collective is how they and their problem resolution can be classified in 
relation to the object, the essence of possibility. In pure creativity the possibilities are 
boundless – there is an abundance of opportunity because these creative people are 
“over the edge”, they break boundaries unconditionally to form the problem outside of 
reason. In both collective creativity and innovation the possibilities are conditioned by 
the boundaries created to form society (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). In collective 
creativity there is an encounter of people around an opportunity. Here the solution is 
constrained by the definition of the problem, which is derived in a community of 
practice with all its norming tendencies. This type of creativity is about crossing over 
accepted boundaries, within reason: that is at the boundaries of acceptability. 
Similarly, innovation is about “leading edge”, constrained possibility. However, in this 
case problem definition, and solution, is constrained by cultural values attached to 
feasibility, for example whether it is financially viable or not. This results in change 
that pushes at the edges using existing reason. Creating a “family” of imaginative 
acts exposes the creative individual and the creative collective supporting each 
other's existence; collective creativity does not diminish the importance of individual 
creativity, each makes the other meaningful. They are not opposites because they 
are not of the same type, or level. Both “over the edge” and “leading edge” 
approaches are needed within the appropriate context and in reaction to the 
particular class of problem. Revealing creativity as a “family” of imagination enables 
us to draw another conclusion – which is that organisations are designed for action 
and not for imagination. 
 
In order to illustrate the above considerations it is helpful to place them in the context 
of change within an organisation. In an organisational setting, creativity is developed 
from the context of the conditions of understanding and the social practices within 
which it is placed. In this false encounter the different classes of creativity have 
become jumbled together in mixed metaphors. Creativity is described both as an 
expression of pure emotion or pure function; it is sometimes bound together with 
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causality; in others it is torn apart. It has also become a symbol of change and 
progress – in this guise creativity is treated as a commodity, where it is claimed there 
is not enough of it. In this way creativity has become the new “problem”; if there is not 
enough of it more must be found. In management's pursuit of the solution to the 
problem contradictory cures abound – these range from forcing to encouraging. 
Collective creativity has become one such popular management remedy. Espousing 
rationality and reason, managerialism has negated the importance of uncertainty and 
the reliance on other kinds of sense making this causes; the emergent nature of 
creativity is thus ignored and replaced by the notion of boundaries, the feasible and 
manageable. Organisations have become designed for action, not for reflection or 
thinking. They contain homogenous communities of practice undertaking similar 
work. They are shaped as hierarchies, and thus they are unsuitable locations for 
heterarchical activity and, “over the edge” imagination: both of these encounters do 
not need to be managed, the creators do not need others to take responsibility for 
their actions, because the individuals involved take responsibility themselves. 
 
Whilst within the context of organisations, some would argue that creativity derives 
from the conditions of understanding and the social practices within which it is 
placed, a counter argument would be that many forms of deviancy, such as those 
artists who revolutionised art, Picasso being an example, did not consider social 
acceptability as a requisite for their creativity. However, having said this, the 
creativeness of such individuals arising from their mental labour became socially 
accepted once their creative work emerged and revealed itself. It can therefore be 
argued those who attempt to create conditions to facilitate creativity in organisations 
are working from a false premise: that the individual is not as important as the social 
in the process of creativity. Paradoxically, their pursuit of creativity curtails its very 
emergence to something less than “pure”, thus less creative. The source of creativity 
is therefore an individual's capacity, which can be excited by the collective. However, 
reversing this process will not necessarily engage an individual's creativity because 
of the conditions. In this context, creativity often reflects a process of breaking free 
from organisational or societal allegiances. 
 
If this misunderstanding of how creativity can be achieved continues, and the “family” 
of creativity is confused as one, there is little hope that individual's creativity can be 
facilitated in their mission by being taught. For this reason, a distinction between 
education and training may be helpful in overcoming such a misunderstanding and 
confusion. Whilst training emphasises the idea of a closed approach, where 
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outcomes are precise in terms of how to do a specific task well or how to achieve 
clear cut solutions to well defined problems, education, on the other hand, can never 
be other than an open approach where the emphasis is on understanding, 
questioning, and seeing things from a range of alternative perspectives by being 
critical (Chaharbaghi and Newman, 1998). Thus, whereas training stresses 
homogeneity and a convergent way of seeing, inherent in education is the notion of 
heterogeneity, tolerance of difference and shifting understanding. From this 
perspective, when training obscures education, the potential for creativity can be 
“trained out” of individuals because an approach to creativity is adopted which is 
repetitious and convergent, promoting conformity, thereby contradicting the need for 
thinking differently and encouraging deviance. Whilst this distinction is helpful to aid 
recognition, education and training are inseparable, although the degree of emphasis 
varies depending on the level of free thinking and creativity that is expected (Schön, 
1991). An important consideration is that while training is part of education, the 
reverse is not necessarily the case (Rawson, 2000). This is because in training, goals 
are narrowly defined within a focused context, whereas in education they are 
ambiguous and cannot be clearly known in advance, because the context within 
which education is facilitated is necessarily loose and wide-ranging (Garavan and 
O'Cinneide, 1994). Thus, in facilitating an individual's creativity, there is a need to 
strike an appropriate synergy between education and training such that individuals 
are encouraged to be deviant, are allowed to live with failure, learn to take risk and 
tolerate uncertainty. 
 
Conclusions 
 
This study has shown how wisdom and creativity play together: they are locked 
together in the trilogy of imagination, action and admiration, and the context within 
which this trilogy is placed can cause them to tumble together in non-linear ways. the 
study has presented contexts that create the possibility to consider creativity as 
located within a “family” of creative events. By allowing the law of the situation to 
govern, classes and forms of creativity have been presented each valuable in its own 
way and in its own context. It has been argued that an essential of creativity is 
deviancy and that this has to be valued to make a difference. In the final analysis 
organisational schizophrenia and its double dialogues have been shown to hide the 
unpalatable truth – that change needs to take place in rational managers' minds 
before collective creativity can be derived. In terms of management training this study 
has revealed that collective creativity becomes an oxymoron in managerial contexts 
when difference is valueless. In such contexts diversity is treated as a constraint, 
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individual and collective creativity are dichotomised, heterogeneous communities of 
interest are treated as homogenous communities of practice, collaboration is 
confused with coordination, and the emergent nature of creativity is disregarded. The 
key consideration is that collective creativity does not diminish the importance of 
individual creativity. This is because individual and collective creativity exist in an 
“and/both” rather than in an “either/or” relationship. In such a relationship without 
individual creativity there is no context for collective creativity and vice versa. It is a 
balance of the individual and societal that makes collective creativity meaningful, and 
collective creativity is not simply the sum of individual creativities, but rather 
intensifies and multiplies them in meeting a challenge of common concern. 
 
 
References 
 
Alcoff, L. (1998), Epistemology: The Big Questions, Blackwell, Oxford 
 
Argyris, C. (1985), Strategy, Change and Defensive Routines, Pitman, Boston, MA 
 
Bourdieu, P. (1993), Sociology in Question, Sage Publications, London, (trans. by 
Nice, R.) 
 
Chaharbaghi, K., Cripps, S. (2006), "Intellectual capital: direction, not blind faith", 
Journal of Intellectual Capital, Vol. 7 No.1, pp.29-42. 
 
Chaharbaghi, K., Cripps, S. (2004), "The irrationality of the rational and non-rational 
models of management: towards a metalectic alternative", Proceedings of the 
Philosophy of Management Conference, St Anne's College, Oxford, July, . 
 
Chaharbaghi, K., Newman, V. (1998), "When production management takes over 
education: the rise and fall of organised education", Management Decision, Vol. 36 
No.8, pp.509-16. 
 
De Leede, J., Looise, J. (2005), "Innovation and HRM: towards an integrated 
framework", Creativity and Innovation Management, Vol. 14 No.2, pp.108-17. 
 
Dunn, S. (1991), "Root metaphor in the old and new industrial relations", British 
Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 28 No.1, pp.1-31. 
 
Easterby-Smith, M., Araujo, L. (1999), in Easterby-Smith, M., Araujo, L., Burgoyne, J. 
(Eds),Organizational Learning and the Learning Organization, Sage Publications, 
London, . 
 
Florida, R. (2002), The Rise of the Creative Class and How It's Transforming Work, 
Leisure, Community and Everyday Life, Basic Books, New York, NY, . 
 
Freire, P. (1972), Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Penguin Education, Harmondsworth, 
(trans. by Bergman Ramos, M.) 
 
Foucault, M. (1980), in Gordon, C. (Eds),Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and 
Other Writings: 1972-1977, Pantheon Books, New York, NY, . 
 16 
 
Garavan, T.N., O'Cinneide, B. (1994), "Entrepreneurship education and training 
programmes: a review and evaluation", Journal of European Industrial Training, Vol. 
18 No.11, pp.13-21. 
 
Giddens, A. (1991), Modernity and Self-identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern 
Age, Polity Press, Cambridge, . 
 
Goffman, E. (1959), The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, Doubleday, New York, 
NY 
 
Goldie, P. (2002), The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford 
 
Hacker, P. (1990), Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind, Blackwell, Oxford, Vol. Vol. 3. 
 
Hagan, J. (1994), Crime and Disrepute, Pine Forge Press, London 
 
Herndl, C. (1993), "Teaching discourse and reproducing culture: a critique of 
research and pedagogy in professional and non-academic writing", College 
Composition and Communication, Vol. 44 No.3, pp.349-63. 
 
Kratzer, J., Leenders, R., Von Engelen, J. (2006), "Team polarity and creative 
performance in innovation teams", Creativity and Innovation Management, Vol. 15 
No.1, pp.96-104 
 
Lakoff, G., Johnson, M. (1980), Metaphors We Live By, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, IL 
 
Lea, J., Young, J. (1993), What Is To Be Done About Law and Order?, Pluto Press, 
London, . 
 
Mead, H. (1934), Mind, Self, and Society, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL 
 
Merton, R. (1938a), "Science and the social order", Philosophy of Science, Vol. 5 
No.3, pp.321-7. 
 
Merton, R. (1938b), "Social structure and anomie", American Sociological Review, 
Vol. 3 pp.672-82. 
 
Miller, A. (2000), Insights of Genius: Imagery and Creativity in Science and Art, MIT 
Press, New York, NY 
 
Chen, M.-H. (2006), "Understanding the benefits and detriments of conflict on team 
creativity processes", Creativity and Innovation Management, Vol. 15 No.1, pp.105-
16. 
 
Newman, V. (2006), "Commentary on ‘Intellectual capital: direction not blind faith’ by 
Chaharbaghi and Cripps", Journal of Intellectual Capital, Vol. 7 No.1, pp.29-42. 
 
Putman, D. (1995), "Bowling alone: America's declining social capital", Journal of 
Democracy, Vol. 6 No.1, pp.65-78. 
 
Rawson, M. (2000), "Learning to learn: more than a skill set", Studies in Higher 
Education, Vol. 25 No.2, pp.225-37. 
 17 
 
Ross, L., Nisbett, R. (1991), The Person and the Situation: Perspectives of Social 
Psychology, McGraw-Hill, New York, NY 
 
Schön, D.A. (1991), The Reflective Turn: Case Studies in and on Educational 
Practice, Teachers Press, Columbia University, New York, NY 
 
Schwartz, P., Ogilvy, J. (1979), The Emergent Paradigm: Changing Patterns of 
Thought and Belief, Life Style Programme, SRI International, Menlo Park, CA, 
Analytical Report 7. 
 
Stacey, R. (2001), Complex Response Process in Organisations: Learning and 
Knowledge Creation, Routledge, London. 
 
Steinbeck, J. (1952), East of Eden, Viking Press, New York, NY 
 
Taylor, K. (2002), "Is imagination more important than knowledge?", Times Higher 
Education Supplement, Vol. 20 December. 
 
Viereck, G.S. (1929), "What life means to Einstein: an interview by G.S. Viereck", 
The Saturday Evening Post, Vol. October 26 pp.117. 
 
Walther, I. (2000), Picasso, Tashen, London 
 
Wittgenstein, L. (2001), Philosophical Investigations, 3rd ed., Oxford 
